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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
garded the claimant as the agent of the manufacturer.6 The gen-
eral rule still is that secondary boycotts are illegal and all such picket-
ing will be enjoined.
IlL
Section 876a of the Civil Practice Act has, however, been re-
sponsible for an abuse. This is illustrated by situations wherein one
union has a closed shop agreement with the employer and another
union pickets to obtain similar benefits for itself. The employer can
not breach his contract with the first union nor can he accede to the
demands of the second union. Injunctive relief is denied because of
the statute holding such a situation to be a labor dispute. Mean-
while the employer's business diminishes because prospective cus-
tomers may be deterred from passing the picket line, either by sym-
pathy for labor in general, or by embarrassment or fear. The em-
ployer in such a case can do nothing but wait for the legislature
to remedy the situation. Of course he can retire, as is usually the
case, for legislators solicit the support of unions at campaign time.
In summation it may be generally said that
(1) In all cases: Picketing accompanied by fraud, violence,
or other illegality is not permissible;
(2) In labor disputes: Peaceful picketing is permissible un--
less contrary to public policy or unless forfeited by
deliberate excesses;
(3) In "non-labor disputes" where:
(a) Labor is not involved: No settled rule at present
but a tendency to regard peaceful picketing as part
of the freedom of speech.
(b). Labor is involved: Peaceful picketing is not
permissible.
ALFRED M. AsCIONE.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES-STATUTORY CHANGES.-When a liti-
gant has the selection of one of two or more inconsistent remedies,
which are available at the same time, a choice made of one, with full
knowledge of all the facts which would enable him to resort to the
other remedy if he so desired, will preclude him from pursuing the
63 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Rippey in Goldfinger v. Fein-
tuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 291, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 915 (1937).
[ VOL. 14
CURRENT LEGISLATION
second or inconsistent remedy.' This is the doctrine of election of
remedies.
This doctrine has long been one for which statutory revision has
been desired.2  Among the many proposals for a statutory change
was one by Professor Rothschild of Brooklyn Law School,3 which
seems to have been generally desired by legal writers.4 His proposal
is as follows: "The doctrine of election of remedies as heretofore
known is abolished. A litigant, unless estopped by his conduct, or
by a former adjudication, or by law otherwise prevented, shall not
be foreclosed from a determination of the merits of his cause or de-
fense. For the purposes of this statute, a former adjudication shall
include any judgment on the merits, on the facts in controversy, ir-
respective of the form of the action or the relief obtainable."
It has also been pointed out 5 that the doctrine of election is
contrary to the Code provisions of many of the states,6 in that it
does not tend to more simplified pleadings. Moreover, there is no
public policy which requires such a doctrine.7 These proposals and
the many articles written on the subject have greatly influenced the
Legislature in seeking a revision of the law on election of remedies.
Accordingly, the Law Revision Commission 8 took over this task and
recommended four additions 9 to the New York Civil Practice Act,
which have resulted in changing the doctrine in four specific instances.
First, however, in order to facilitate the study of, and appreciate more
thoroughly the significance of the changes, a discussion of the com-
mon law doctrine seems advisable.
I.
The remedies, in order for them to be affected by the doctrine,
must be inconsistent 10 and must proceed on "opposite and irrecon-
1 Henry v. Herrington, 193 N. Y. 218, 86 N. E. 29 (1908) ; Clark v. Kirby,
243 N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926); CARmODy, NFw YORK PRAcrIcc (2d ed.
1931) § 903; 18 Am. JuP. (1938) p. 133, § 10, divides the definition into three
elements: "1. The existence of two or more remedies; 2. the inconsistency
between such remedies; and 3. a choice of one of them."2 Hines, Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 HARV. L. REv. 707;
Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 341, 480;
Rothschild, A Remedy for Election of Remedies! A Proposed Act to Abolish
Election of Remedies (1929) 14 Coue. L. Q. 141.
3 Rothschild, loc. cit. supra note 2.
4 Davidson, A Proposal to Abolish the Doctrine of Election of Remedies(1934) 13 Oma. L. REv. 298.
5 Davidson, loc. cit. supra note 4.
6 Section 8 of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT reads as follows: "Only one form
of civil action. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and
the forms of those actions and suits have been abolished."
7 Davidson, loc. cit. supra note 4.
s The Chairman of the New York Law Revision Commission is Charles
K. Burdick. The Commission issued a pamphlet showing the results of their
research in the field of election of remedies entitled Acts, Recommendation and
Study Relating to Election of Remedies, LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939).9 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 112a-112d."
20 Deinard and Deinard, loc. cit. upra note 2.
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cilable claims of right". 1  If the remedies are merely cumulative or
consistent, 12 the doctrine does not apply,1 3 even though two or more
remedies are available. A remedy is cumulative where further relief
is merely sought, and where it does not proceed on an inconsistent
ground.1 4 But an action to rescind a contract and an action for dam-
ages for fraud arising out of the contract are inconsistent, since the
fraud action affirms the contract, while the rescission action disaf-
firms it.15 An action for replevin and an action for goods sold and
delivered are also inconsistent, since to allow this would let a litigant
say, "I, sold, I never sold", in the same breath.16 Similarly, the con-
tract and conversion remedies.
17
The election once made is irrevocable.' 8  It is deemed to have
taken place by the commencement of suit,' 9 and judgment need not
11 Henry v. Herrington, 193 N. Y. 218, 86 N. E. 29 (1908); CARMODY,
op. cit. sapra note 1, at § 904.12 Titus v. Poole, 145 N. Y. 414, 40 N. E. 228 (1895) (breach of warranty
and fraud are not inconsistent); Parker v. Knox, 60 Hun 550, 15 -N. Y. Supp.
256 (1891) (action of deceit and implied warranty of agency are consistent) ;
Balleisen v. Schiff, 121 App. Div. 285, 105 N. Y. Supp. 692 (2d Dept. 1907)
(specific performance and an action for damages for breach of contract are not
inconsistent) ; Hahn v. Schenck, 221 App. Div. 371, 223 N. Y. Supp. 418 (2d
Dept. 1927) (a negligence action against one defendant and suit against the
attending physician for malpractice are consistent) ; Kirchner v. State of New
York, 223 App. Div. 543, 228 N. Y. Supp. 718 (3d Dept. 1928) (judgment
against one tort-feasor is no bar to suit against another tort-feasor jointly and
severally liable).
13 Ratchford v. Cayuga County Cold Storage and Warehouse Co., 217
N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447 (1916) ; 18 AM. JUR. (1938) p. 136, § 13; Deinard
and Deinard, supra note 2, at 492: "If the remedies are not inconsistent but are
alternative and complementary, or otherwise so reconcilable that the law will not
regard the assumption of one position as a repudiation of the others, then the
situation does not warrant invoking the rule."
14 Tremarco v. Tremarco, 117 N. J. Eq. 50, 174 Atl. 898 (1934). For
examples of consistent remedies see note 12, supra.15 Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin and Hollis Real Estate Co., 230 N. Y.
316, 130 N. E. 306 (1921) ; CARMODY, loc. cit. supra note 11; cf. Abramson v.
Leo, 240 App. Div. 343, 269 N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dept. 1934) ; see Note (1939)
14 ST. JoaN's L. Rxv. 124.
Is Henry v. Herrington, 193 N. Y. 218, 86 N. E. 29 (1908).
17 Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272 (1899) ; Hess v. Smith,
16 Misc. 55, 37 N. Y. Supp. 635 (1896) ; Emerald and Phoenix Brewing Co. v.
Leonard, 22 Misc. 120, 48 N. Y. Supp. 706 (1897).
18 LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 31.
19 Conrow v. Little, 115 N. Y. 387, 393, 22 N. E. 346, 347 (1889) ("They
could not do both, and there must be a time when their election should be
considered final. We think that time was when they commenced an action for
the sum due under the contract") ; Matter of Garver, 176 N. Y. 386, 68 N. E.
667 (1903) ; Haas v. Selig, 27 Misc. 504, 58 N. Y. Supp. 328 (1899).
However, one may be bound to a remedy other than by suit, i.e., by waiver
or estoppel. LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 35. While election is based largely on
waiver and estoppel, there are grave distinctions between them. Election differs
from estoppel in that a person invoking the election doctrine need not show that
he will suffer from any injury if the other party is not estopped from going
ahead with his action. Pederson v. Christofferson, 97 Minn. 491, 106 N. W.
958 (1906). It differs from waiver in that one who waives a right does it of
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follow. In Matter o' Garver, 20 the court said: "It is therefore the
settled law of this court that an election of remedies is determined by
the- commencement of an action and not by the result of it." An
exception to this principle lies where the action is one in rescission.
In such a case, there is no election of remedies made by the mere
commencement of suit, since the court's permission to sue for rescis-
sion must first be granted.21
In order for the doctrine to apply, the election must be made
with full knowledge of all the facts relating thereto.22 Thus, mistake
as to the facts, or ignorance of them, is not a bar to a later incon-
sistent action.23  Similarly, mistake as to legal rights in selecting the
remedy, such as electing a remedy in which the Statute of Limitations
is a bar and a resulting failure in the first action, does not constitute
an election of remedies.2 4 "In such case it cannot be said that the
party has made an election of remedies, there was in fact but one
remedy, and the party has simply made a mistake as to what that
remedy is." 25
II.
The main argument cited 2 6 in support of the doctrine of election
is that "a litigant should not be permitted to vex another party or
burden the courts by more than one action to redress one wrong or
to enforce one right." The argument is answered by the Commis-
sion when it says that any number of consistent suits are allowed
against the same defendant, and also, that discretionary apportion-
ment of costs might be the answer. 27
As against these supporting arguments, there have been many
criticisms submitted.2 8 The most important of these are that the
courts differ as to the principles on which the doctrine of election
his own volition or by his own act, while in the election doctrine, the state
declares the second right to be non-usable when the election of the first remedy
is made. Deinard and Deinard, loc. cit. supra note 2.
20 176 N. Y. 386, 68 N. E. 667 (1903).21 Abramson v. Leo, 269 N. Y. Supp. 814, 240 App. Div. 343 (1st Dept.
1934); Houston Mercantile Co. v. Powell, 72 Misc. 358, 130 N. Y. Supp. 274
(1911) ; LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 45.
22 See note 1, supra.
23 Smith v. Savin, 141 N. Y. 315, 36 N. E. 338 (1894); Robson v. Bass,
80 Misc. 132, 149 N. Y. Supp. 693 (1913) (plaintiff did not remember that he
had been told of an undisclosed principal; nevertheless, he was awarded judg-
ment, the defense of election being set aside) ; CARMODY, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 907.
24 Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 542 (1924).
25 Ibid.; McNutt v. Hilkins, 80 Hun 235, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1047 (1894);
CARMODY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1731.
26 The argument is stated and refuted by the Law Revision Commission in
their report of the Doctrine of Election of Remedies. LEG. Doc. No. 65(F)
(1939) 54.
27 Ibid.
28 Hines, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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depends,2 9 that, in most instances, the operation of the doctrine is very
harsh,30 and that the principle on which the law rests is inconsistent
with other laws.31
nII.
The trend in New York, prior to the passage of the new legis-
lation,82 was toward liberality in the application of this doctrine, as
shown by the cases of Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co.33 and
Clark v. Kirby.3 4 These cases laid down the rule that if an action for
deceit is discontinued because of the defense of the Statute of Limita-
tions, a subsequent rescission action is not barred. Furthermore, in
the Clark case it was said that an action seeking the return of a con-
sideration and "reliance damages" 35 is not as a matter of law incon-
sistent with rescission.3 6  Therein Judge Crane said,37 "* * * In
this state we say that where a party, knowing all the facts, elects to
sue in rescission instead of for damages, he must pursue the course
he has taken. Even then, if the remedy chosen be insufficient or
inadequate or useless, the rule has not barred the plaintiff from tak-
ing other timely methods to obtain his rights. All procedure is
merely a methodical means whereby the court reaches out to restore
rights and remedy wrongs; it must never become more important
than the purpose which it seeks to accomplish. Unless some neces-
sary requirement has been omitted the courts ought not to furnish
protection for a wrongful act." The language used here seems broad
29 Some courts hold that an estoppel, too, is needed for the doctrine to
apply. Gibbs v. Jones, 46 III. 319 (1868); Hines, supra note 2, at 711; see
note 47, infra.
30Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272 (1899); Stewart v.
Salisbury Realty and Insurance Co., 159 N. C. 230, 74 S. E. 736 (1912).
31 Hines, supra note 2, at 711.
32 N. Y. Laws 1939, cc. i26, 127, 128, 147.
3 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 542 (1924). In that case plaintiff commenced
an action to recover damages for fraud. He then discontinued this action after
it was placed on the calendar because of a defense of the Statute of Limitations
interposed by the answer of the defendant and he now brings suit for rescission.
Held, doctrine of election does not apply. There was but one remedy, and if
recourse is had to a second remedy after the first is found to be unavailable,
there is no election of remedies made.
34243 N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926). Therein plaintiff started a rescis-
sion action in New York and later sued in fraud in Missouri against the same
defendants. The defendants in the New York action plead election of remedies
as a defense. Held, the defense was not valid since the election was made by
the prior action for rescission in New York and not by the subsequent Missouri
action.
35 5 WILLISTON, CONTRaACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1464. Reliance damages are
those which would place the plaintiff in the same position he would have been
in, had he not entered the contract; i.e., restore to him any expenses incurred in
reliance on the contract.
36 LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 49.
37 Clark v. Kirby, 243 N. Y. 295, 303, 153 N. E. 79, 82 (1926).
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enough to include cases where a judgment has been entered, but not
satisfied.
Although these cases liberalize generally, they do not uproot
the doctrine or settle the law of election of remedies. To use the Law
Revision Committee's 38 own words, "The effect of the foregoing de-
cisions must be to discourage and, in new and doubtful cases to re-
strict, the application of the doctrine of election of remedies. This
being so, the commission does not recommend any general legisla-
tion. It confined its proposals to special cases where lines of decision
have caused injustice or confusion and where those lines have existed
so long that it seems probable-even in the light of the Schenck and
Clark cases that only legislation can bring relief."
IV.
The Law Revision Commission recommended that statutory
changes be made to correct four special instances of the doctrine of
election, with the result that four bills 3 9 were approved by the Senate
and Assembly, signed by the Governor, and incorporated into the
Civil Practice Act as Section 112, subdivisions a to d.
Section 112(a) reads as follows:
"Rights of action against several persons; no election of
remedies. Where rights of action exist against several per-
sons, the institution or maintenance of an action against one,
or the recovery against one of a judgment which is unsatisfied,
shall not be deemed an election of remedies which bars an
action against the others."
The instance here corrected is best exemplified by the case of
Fowler v. Bowery Savings Bank.40 Therein A deposited money with
D, in trust for W. A and W died, and W'Ts executor served notice
on D that they claimed the trust fund. D, however, surrendered it
to A's executor. W's executor brought an action against D. D de-
fended by claiming an irrevocable election of remedies had been made
when W's executor sued A's executor for money had and received,
which resulted in an unsatisfied judgment. The court held, that an
election was made and that both defendants could not be sued, be-
cause suit against the executor affirmed the action of the bank in
turning over the moneys to him.41  Under the present statute, how-
38 LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 9.
39 N. Y. Laws 1939, cc. 126, 127, 128, 147.
40 113 N. Y. 450, 21 N. E. 172 (1889).
42Accord: It re Jama Realty Corp., 92 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Seeman v. Bandler, 26 Misc. 372, 56 N. Y. Supp. 210 (1899) (vendor was held
precluded from maintaining action against purchaser for value of goods sold,
by suing purchaser's transferee in replevin on the ground of the purchaser's
fraud) ; Hochberger v. Ludvigh, 63 Misc. 313, 116 N. Y. Supp. 696 (1909).
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ever, the action can be brought against the third party without a de-
fense of inconsistent remedies being raised.
Section 112(b) reads:
"Rights of action against agent and undisclosed principal;
no election of remedies. Where rights of action exist against
an agent and his undisclosed principal, the institution or main-
tenance, after disclosure of the principal, of an action against
either, or the recovery of a judgment against either which is
unsatisfied, shall not be deemed an election of remedies which
bars an action against the other."
This subdivision remedies the situation which was presented by
Georgi v. Texas Company.42  In that case suit was brought against
the agent of an undisclosed principal and judgment was recovered.43
Since the plaintiff proceeded to judgment 44 against the agent with
a full knowledge of all the facts regarding the agency, it was held
that he was precluded from suing the principal because of an election
of inconsistent remedies. Under the present statute, both the agent
and the undisclosed principal may be pursued to judgment without
any election being required, even after knowledge of the facts of the
agency, ds long as the first judgment remains unsatisfied.
Section 112(c) follows:
"Actions in conversion and on contract; no election of rem-
edies. Where rights of action exist against several persons for
the conversion of property and upon an express or implied
contract, the institution or maintenance of an action against
one of these persons, or the recovery against one of them of
a judgment which is unsatisfied, for the conversion or upon
the contract, shall not be deemed an election of remedies which
bars a subsequent action against the others either for conver-
sion or upon the contract."
In Terry v. Munger,45 judgment was obtained by the plaintiff
on the theory of implied contract against two of three persons, who
wrongfully detached and carried away machinery belonging to the
plaintiff. This action was brought against the third person and was
in conversion. It was held 46 that the action could not be brought
42225 N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238 (1919).
4 Accord: Knapp v. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284 (1884) (agent was sued first,
and after judgment was recovered against him, he went into bankruptcy; suit
is now brought against the principal. Held, action must fail since knowledge
of all the facts of the agency were had at the inception of the suit against the
agent); DeRemer v. Brown, 165 N. Y. 410, 59 N. E. 129 (1901).
44 In principal-agent actions, the suit must proceed to judgment in order
for there to be an election. Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348 (1877).
45 121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272 (1899).
46 Accord: Hess v. Smith, 16 Misc. 55, 37 N. Y. Supp. 635 (1896).
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because the first action treated the entire transaction as a sale and
was an irrevocable election which was binding on the plaintiff, since
he had full knowledge of all the facts at the inception of 'the first
action. The statute remedies this instance in that one of several de-
fendants may be sued in conversion and the others in contract, and
the actions are no longer to be deemed inconsistent, as long as thejudgment remains unsatisfied. It is to be noted, however, that the
statute does not sanction both a conversion and contract action against
the same defendant.
Section 112(d) states:
"Action on contract no bar to action to reform. A judgment
denying recovery in an action upon an agreement in writing
shall not be deemed to bar an action to reform such agreement
and to enforce it as reformed."
In Steinbach v. Relief Fire Insurance Co.,47 the plaintiff sued
the insurance company to recover on a policy for damages caused by
fire. The policy had a clause avoiding it if hazardous goods were kept
on the premises. Fireworks, however, were permitted to be kept
for sale, but no clause was inserted relating thereto. The fire was
caused by fireworks and plaintiff brought an action to recover on the
policy. The recovery on the policy was refused,' and subsequently
this action was brought to reform the contract on the ground that
the clause was omitted by mistake from the policy. Held,48 recovery
and reformation denied, since the plaintiff elected to sue on the con-
tract and, once defeated, was bound by his election. This case has
been remedied by Section 112(d), which allows the reformation ac-
tion to proceed immediately after defeat in the first contract action.
This section expressly corrects the situation involved in the Steinbach
case, but it is submitted that it allows a single defendant to be doubly
vexed on the same set of facts. Therefore, this statute, which is de-
4777 N. Y: 498 (1879).
48 In the case of Allen v. U. S. Fire Insurance Co., 245 App. Div. 31, 282
N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dept. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 270 N. Y. 597, 1 N. E.(2d) 348 (1935), a fire insurance policy provided that all cases were to be
submitted to the Cuban courts. The Cuban court held that the loss was not
covered by the pqlicy; the plaintiff then started an action for reformation here.
The court said in their opinion, "On principle, there would seem to be substantial
doubt whether the plaintiff should not be permitted to maintain this action on
the theory of mistake. The purpose of this action is to secure the reformation
of the written policy so that it shall correctly express the alleged intentions of
the parties by including the loss. The previous action merely held that the
loss was not covered by the terms of the policy as they had been reduced to
writing. It may, therefore, not unreasonably be contended that the issues are
not identical and that the previous action is not res adjudicata here. We are,
however, constrained to affirm the judgment and order, with costs, on the
authority of Steinbach v. Relief Fire Insurance Co."
For the unsettled state of the law see Baird v. Erie R. R., 210 N. Y. 225,
104 N. E. 614 (1914) (where reformation was allowed for mistake after defeat
on the contract).
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signed io correct a specific evil, may do more harm than good. How-
ever, since the Commission and the Legislature have adopted Section
112(d) allowing suit against the same defendant on the contract, and
then, upon defeat, to sue for reformation, why in Section 112(c) of
the Act Were they inconsistent, in not allowing both a contract and
conversion action against the same defendant?
These statutory changes in the common law rule, effective Sep-
tember 1, 1939, are among the first statutes passed which tend to
abolish the doctrine.49 The law elsewhere in the United States and
England, still follows the common law doctrine of election of
remedies.
50
The Law Revision Commission in its report said that it desired
to correct the four above-mentioned specific instances only, and that
they did not recommend any general -legislation to do away with the
doctrine. 51 They felt that any cases not covered by these sections
of the Statute would be covered by the liberality of the courts as
shown in the Schenck and Clark cases. However, instead of draw-
ing statutes doing away with parts of the doctrine and leaving the
rest to courts whose diversity has been one of the difficulties in its
application, 52 why not adopt Professor Rothschild's proposal 53 and
say, "The doctrine of election of remedies as heretofore known, is
abolished."
SEYMOUR C. SIMON.
THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AcT.-A truly remark-
able example of the manner in which the law is attempting to keep
pace with social realities is the development of the modem concept of
juvenile delinquency.' At common law the status of an infant ac-
49 Section 80(d) of. the N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW denies application of the
doctrine of election of remedies expressly. That section reads as follows:
"After retaking of possession * * * the buyer shall be liable for the price only
after a resale * * *. Neither the bringing of an action by the seller for the
recovery of the whole or any part of the' price, nor the recovery of judgment
in such action, nor the collection of a portion of the price, shall be deemed
inconsistent with a later retaking of the goods * * *. But such right of retaking
shall not be exercised by the seller after he has collected the entire price, or
after he has claimed a lien upon the goods, or attached them, ,or levied upon
them as the goods of the buyer."
See the Draft of an International Law of Sale of Goods [League of
Nations (1935) Unification of Private Law No. 1] L. 0. N. 1935, U. P. L.
Draft 1, which allows rescission and damages for breach of contract as consis-
tent actions.
50 LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 39.
5" Id. at 9.
15 See notes 15, 29 and 47, supra.
53 See note 2, .rupra.
1 See U. S. Children's Bureau Pub. No. 193 (1933) 1, 2.
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